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The Jury at Work
By JACK LEAvrrr*
M... [Wie gather twelve ignorami together and, after pumping law
into them they cannot comprehend, and surfeiting them with testi-
mony which they are incompetent to analyze or unable to remember,
we allow a dozen or so shyster lawyers to befog them with their soph-
istry, to drive out what little of the law and evidence may have found
lodgment in their befuddled brains, then lock them up until the most
obstinate jackass in the crowd coerces the others into submission or
drives them to open revolt.",
"We didn't believe the witnesses on either side, so we made up our
minds to disregard all the evidence and decide the case on its merits."2
THE FUNCTIONS, duties, and rights of jurymen have changed
considerably since the Assize of Clarendon in 1166 required twelve
of the most lawful men from each hundred (i.e., from each territorial
district) to state under oath whether their community harbored any
man accused or publicly suspected of being or receiving a robber,
murderer, or thief. During the turmoils of their early history, jurors
could be convicted of perjury and punished heavily for a wilfully
wrong verdict; 8 they could be empaneled by the King's connivance
for the specific purpose of acquitting a defendant on whom judgment
was to be passed;4 they could be kept without meat, drink, fire, or
candle in their deliberations and, if they failed to agree on a verdict
before the judges left the town, could be carried around the judicial
circuit in a cart.5
B.A., 1951, Brooklyn College; LL.B., 1957, M.A., 1958, University of Illinois. Mem-
ber, Illinois and California Bars.
1 1 BnANN, THE ICONCLAST 216 (1903).
2 Statement of an unidentified juror in WEiwN, GENTLEMEN OF THE Juny 263
(1937).
S 3 THAYm, A PRELIINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE CON24ON LAW 137-68
(1898).
4 Letter from Denbenham, Tymperley, and Wbite to Paston, 2 May 1451, in KEN-
DALL, SoURCE BOOK OF ENGLiSH HISTORY 117 (1900).
5 111 BLAcsTON r, CoMmENTAmE-s *375-76.
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With the passage of time, the men who transmuted jurisprudence
into dollars and cents were able to perform their duties in a more com-
fortable, less terrifying atmosphere. By the 1840's, jurors in California
who were addicted to cutting up desks and mutilating other courtroom
furniture were not punished but, instead, were provided with wooden
boards and reminded, "Whittle the boards; spare the desks."6 Still
later, the jury's right to meals, lodging, and transportation at the
county's expense was established over the county's protest that it had
no legal authority to pay those bills.- Ideal jury facilities, under the
modem view, were described as including a well-ventilated jury room,
upholstered arm chairs, and free parking space.8 To insure that jury
integrity would be protected from the curiosity of university profes-
sors, among others, the federal government and the state of California
enacted penal legislation against eavesdropping on jury deliberations
or voting.9
Despite these improvements in the jury's decisional environment,
the conduct of its members often aggrieved the litigants against whom
they returned unfavorable verdicts. Charges of jury misconduct con-
tinued to be laid before the courts on a variety of grounds, from taking
unauthorized papers into the jury room, to bantering with an attorney
at a water fountain, to experimenting during deliberations, to arriving
1 HISTORY OF THE BENCH AND BAn IN CALIFORNIA 108 (Bates ed. 1912).
7Hart Bros. Co. v. Los Angeles County, 31 Cal App. 2d Supp. 766, 82 P.2d 221
(1938). See also CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1135-36.
"8 HOLROOK, A SuRvEY OF METROPOLITAN TRIAL CouNTs. Los ANGELES AREA 112
(1956).
11 See 18 U.S.C. § 1508; CAL. PEN. CODE § 167. For the background to this legisla-
tion see the Hearings Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the
Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary ("Recordings of Jury Deliberations by the University of Chicago"), 84th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1955). The Senate Subcommittee, consisting of Senators James 0. Eastland
(D., Miss.) and William E. Jenner (R., Ind.), evaluated the University of Chicago School
of Law's jury research project on the basis of questions like the following, some of which
may impress the reader as odd thrusts in a controversy about jury secrecy:
"Now, do you not realize that to snoop on a jury, and to record what they say, does
violence to every reason for which we have secret deliberations of a jury?" (P. 5 of the
Hearings.)
"All right; were you one, sir, of a group of lawyers who in 1948 assailed the tactics
of the House Un-American Activities Committee as a spy hunt?" (P. 25.)
"Do you know anything, sir, of any Communist group within the faculty of the Uni-
versity of Chicago?" (P. 31.)
"Do you believe that the American jury system is one of the greatest safeguards of
human liberty?" (P. 45.)
"Have you read the Daily Worker?" (P. 47.)
"Do you remember speaking at a rally which was advertised with handbills, 'They
Must Not Die,' a rally to save the Rosenbergs?" (P. 86.)
"Do you know whether the seventh amendment protection for jury trials involves
necessarily the protection of the absolute freedom of deliberation of the jury?" (P. 187.)
at chance verdicts, to drinking intoxicating liquors during the trial,
and to various other transgressions. This article seeks to describe and
analyze these breaches of duty so that an attorney who discovers sim-
ilar misconduct has a convenient picture of how it bears on a motion
for new trial or an appeal. For the sake of completeness, the article
also considers the judge's direct relations with the jury, except for
omitting his role in jury selection and in giving his initial instructions.
Most of the following discussion has as its implicit reference point
the state constitutional provision decreeing that no judgment will be
set aside or new trial granted for procedural errors unless the court
believes that a miscarriage of justice has resulted.10 Since perfect jus-
tice does not necessarily depend on the symmetrical application of
fixed rules, the attorney should be prepared to discover the court rou-
tinely brushing aside clear violations of established legal procedures.
Is this leniency to be encouraged? For those who believe in law as
ritual, as eternally fixed commands and taboos rather than as a means
to social justice, these deviations are vile: "The taboo, by its nature,
does not admit of experimental verification. The native does not dare,
by ignoring it, to make the test; or if by chance, involuntarily, he does,
still he is more likely to support the theory by promptly dying of fright
than to live to note the nonappearance of the consequences." 1
To those others who believe that no system is more virtuous than its
results, the courts' willingness to overlook error is most often a mark
of inspired good sense.
Jury Intoxication
Two examples of alleged jury intoxication provide a pleasant ape-
ritif for a discussion of jury misconduct. Because of its belief that "The
purity and correctness of the verdict should be guarded in every way,
that the administration of justice should not be subjected to scandal
and distrust," the California Supreme Court once reversed a murder
conviction in which there was strong reason to suspect a juror of
having drunk so much as to unfit him for the proper discharge of his
duty. 2 This strong reason, which prompted some concurring justices
to condemn the entire jury, was based on a disclosure that during the
course of trial the jury drank at least seventeen and one-half gallons
of beer, a two gallon demijohn of wine, three bottles of claret, and an
undetermined amount of whiskey. By preventing a fair and due con-
20 CAL. CONSr. art. VI, §41A.
11 I StmNER & KELLER, THE SCIENCE oF SociETY 1098 (1928).
12People v. Gray, 61 Cal. 164, 186 (1882).
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sideration of the case, this conduct warrants the granting of a new
trial.13
Nine years later the same tribunal apparently discovered that
courtroom air cures drunkenness. 14 A juror had admittedly drunk in-
toxicating liquors out of court and was under their influence during
recess, but his sobriety in the courtroom was the subject of conflicting
evidence. In determining whether this "outside" intoxication was suf-
ficient as a matter of law to infect the verdict, the supreme court held: 15
If, while in his capacity of juror, he was sober, heard the evidence,
understood and appreciated it and the instructions of court and ar-
gument of counsel, and was then able intelligently to understand,
deliberate, and determine what should be the verdict, with his fellow-
jurors, we are unable to perceive that the verdict was arrived at
accompanied by misconduct on the part of the juror while performing
his duty. He was guilty of drinking more than he ought, when out of
court, but does not seem ever to have been under its influence while
sitting or deliberating as a juror. At those times his mind was clear,
and no misconduct is shown to have occurred. (Emphasis added.)
Perhaps, however, in spite of this erratic temperance philosophy,
the decision really turned on the proverbial in vino veritas.
Authorized and Unauthorized Separations
To reduce the chance of outside influence or distraction, the mem-
bers of the jury are kept together (whenever feasible) during their
tenure as purifiers of disputed fact. If permitted to separate, they are
warned not to speak or listen to any other person about the subject of
the trial, and not to form or express an opinion until the case is finally
submitted to them.16 This enforced comradeship is most stringently
observed when, under charge of an officer, the jury retires to some
convenient place to deliberate on a verdict.17
Jurors being what they are (e.g., "one of the chief props and bul-
warks of civil liberty"' 8 ), this limitation on free assemblage is some-
times ignored. (Sometimes, too, authority for a separation may be
sought by an attorney seeking to curry favor with the jury,' 9 while at
13 Id. at 186. It was noted that if it is "necessary" for a juror to drink intoxicating
liquors, he should apply for the court's leave to do so.
14 People v. Deegan, 88 Cal. 602, 26 Pac. 500 (1891). See also People v. Romero,
12 Cal. App. 466, 107 Pac. 709 (1910).
15 88 Cal. at 606-07, 26 Pac. at 501-02.
16 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 611; CAL. PEN. CoDE §§ 1121-22.
"7-CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 613; CAL. PEN. CODE § 1128.
18 May, Trial By Jury, MODERN JuRy TRIALS 169 (Donovan ed. 1908).
19 See Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Southern Pac., 13 Cal. App. 2d 505, 57 P.2d 575
(1936), where the jury's being permitted to separate for a single evening was held not
to have jeopardized the interests of the complaining party.
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other times a charge of unlawful separation may be based on a claim
that while the jurors were going to or coming from the courtroom, all
in full view of the officer in charge, one juror lagged behind his asso-
ciates.20 )
When raising these alleged irregularities on appeal, the complain-
ing party should be prepared to establish three facts:
21
1. A separation actually occurred.
2. The separation was unauthorized and contrary to the court's
instructions.
3. Improper influence might have been brought to bear on one
or more jurors during this interval.
The party seeking to sustain the verdict must then negative the
presumption of improper influence and show that no such attempt was
made. If he does so, the irregularity is disregarded. 22
Authorized separations also create difficulties, chief among them
being a question of whether the court has power to authorize the
practice in the first place. By a four to three decision, 23 the California
Supreme Court has held that the Code of Civil Procedure, properly
read, vests this power in the trial court. Although the lower court
justified his action in this case "because of the possibility of black-outs,
air raid, and that sort of thing,"24 the supreme court, leaving aside
such wartime flexibility, based its approval on the supposed implica-
tions of sections 611 and 613.
Section 611, which begins, "If the jury are permitted to separate
.. " contains the foreseeable implication that the trial court has au-
thority to separate the jury either before or after the case is submitted
to them. Who else, if not the judge, could give the necessary permis-
sion? Section 613, which says that if the jury retire for deliberations,
20 People v. Walther, 27 Cal. App. 2d 583, 81 P.2d 452 (1938). This claim failed,
but the judgment of conviction was reversed on other grounds.
21See Saltzman v. Sunset Tel. & Tel. Co., 125 Cal. 501, 58 Pac. 169 (1899).
22 Id. In Saltzman, the alleged misconduct occurred when one juror, in the presence
of a deputy sheriff but away from the other jurors, telephoned his father-in-law with a
request for that relative to take care of the juror's horse. Since the telephone company
was the defendant, the losing plaintiff complained that improper communications could
have been made during this unauthorized separation. Judgment, however, was afrmed.
While the juror's conduct was a gross impropriety, the court said, the brevity of the com-
munication, the presence of the deputy, and the juror's own affidavit denying misconduct
are sufficient to rebut the presumption of injury. See also People v. Cord, 157 Cal. 562,
108 Pac. 511 (1910), a criminal case stating that a new trial should be granted if the
jury were permitted to separate during their deliberations under such circumstances that
they might have been tampered with, unless there is affirmative proof explaining the
separation and showing that the defendant was not prejudiced. In Cord, a slight sepa-
ration, due to the confusion arising from a nearby fire, was held non-prejudicial.
23 McDowd v. Pig'n Whistle Corp., 26 Cal. 2d 696, 160 P.2d 797 (1945).
24 Id. at 697, 160 P.2d at 798.
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"they must be kept together," means, according to this reasoning,
that: 25
IT]he jury is not to separate on their own volition or by permission
of the officer in charge. It does not mean that the court may not order
a separation. It provides that the jury must be kept together. That
duty falls on the officer in charge. Hence, it is concerned with his
duties rather than the power of the court to direct a separation.
Sharply critical of this theory, the dissenting opinion declared :
2
11
The conclusion that, in a civil action, a trial judge may, without the
consent of the parties, allow the jurors to separate during their delib-
erations and before they have reached a verdict, in my opinion, not
only rests upon a strained and unwarranted construction of the appli-
cable statute but also sets aside procedure which has been established
in this state for more than fifty years.
From the present author's point of view, the majority in McDowd
v. Pig'n Whistle Corp. achieved a proper result despite their tailoring
legislative intent with the same skill employed by the legendary em-
peror's clothing merchants. Using justice as the pattern, but legisla-
tive silence as the cloth, the court here recognized that separation
alone need not lead to corruption. With that premise the court should
have rested.
Taking Materials into the Deliberation Room
When the jurors retire to consider a verdict, they are permitted in
both civil and criminal cases to take the following memory aids with
them: all papers that have been received in evidence (except for depo-
sitions and for papers that should remain with the person having them
in his possession), and their own notes of the testimony or other pro-
ceedings at the trialY Beyond this mutually acceptable point, Code
of Civil Procedure section 612 and Penal Code section 1137 vary in
their provisions. Under section 612, jurors are permitted to utilize any
"exhibits" (presumably consisting of non-documentary real evidence)
which the court deems proper, a privilege not mentioned in section
1137 but granted by court decision .2  Through a different approach
25 Id. at 699, 160 P.2d at 798. See also Marinucci v. Bryant, 151 Cal. App. 2d 298,
311 P.2d 622 (1957), citing McDowd to support the proposition that mere separation
does not require reversal.
26 26 Cal. 2d at 701, 160 P.2d at 799 (dissent).
27 CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. § 612; CAL. PEN. CODE § 1137.
28 For the taking of exhibits other than papers into the jury room in criminal trials,
see People v. Lyons, 50 Cal. 2d 245, 324 P.2d 556 (1958) (articles of allegedly stolen
property); People v. Walker, 150 Cal. App. 2d 594, 310 P.2d 110 (1957) (tape recording
and recording machine); People v. Barrett, 22 Cal. App. 780, 136 Pac. 520 (1913) (over-
coat, revolver, piece of bloody flooring).
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to statutory silence, courts consider it irregular for jurors in civil cases
to take instructions into the jury room since the Code of Civil Proce-
dure does not authorize the practice.2 9 No equivalent problem arises
in criminal trials because section 1137 specifically permits written in-
structions to be taken to the deliberation room.
The wisdom of these statutory incongruities has been questioned
elsewhere8 ° and need be considered here only as a passing aspect of
the more general problem: When does prejudice result from the taking
of an unauthorized paper into the jury room? According to the cases,
"rarely."
A cultural deficiency in early English life explains why jurors were
initially restricted in their use of writings, and makes more understand-
able a modem court's reluctance to overturn a verdict because of an
irregularity in this procedure. Jurors in those days were generally il-
literate. Since a writing conveyed nothing to them, unsealed instru-
ments were customarily excluded from the deliberation room except
with the consent of the parties. Sealed instruments, although just as
incomprehensible from a literary standpoint, were allowed in the jury's
custody because the jurors, drawn from the immediate vicinity, were
familiar with the seals, which were derived from neighborhood armo-
rial bearings. Being recognizable, a seal spoke for the genuineness of
a document.3 ' To abate these restrictions when conditions no longer
warranted such practices, Code of Civil Procedure section 612 was
enacted, not as a limitation on the court's power, but to modify and
extend the common law rules in regard to the use of writings.
32
Influenced by this permissive philosophy, courts have sustained
verdicts in the face of claims that prejudice had occurred because the
jurors improperly took the following materials to the jury room: Depo-
sitions (specifically prohibited by statute);33 written instructions; 34
29 See, e.g., Shelton v. Burke, 167 Cal. App. 2d 507, 334 P.2d 616 (1959); and see
note 34 infra.
30 See Cunningham, Should Instructions Go Into the Jury Room? 33 Cal. S. BAR J.
278 (1958); CALiFonsA LAW RESION CoMMIssION, RECOMM NDATION AND STuDy RE-
LAT G To TAKiNG INSTRUCTIONS To THE Jtmy Room (November 10, 1956). Both sources
recommend that juries in criminal and civil cases be allowed to take a copy of the court's
instructions with them.
31 See H-iggins v. Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co., 159 Cal. 651, 115 Pac. 313 (1911);
THAYEn, A PRE.hn.INARY TEATISE ON EviDENcE AT TE COMMON LAW 104-112 (1898).
32 See supra note 31.
'3 Davenport v. Waite, 175 Cal. App. 2d 623, 346 P.2d 501 (1959); Quiring v. Zam-
boni, 148 Cal. App. 2d 890, 307 P.2d 650 (1957).
34 Shelton v. Burke, 167 Cal. App. 2d 507, 334 P.2d 616 (1959); Lewis v. Southern
Pac., 98 Cal. App. 2d 358, 220 P.2d 431 (1950); Melikian v. Independent Paper Stock
Co., 8 Cal. App. 2d 166, 47 P.2d 539 (1935); Fererira v. Silvey, 38 Cal. App. 346; 176
Pac. 371 (1918). In Shelton, the court recalled the jury after several hours of delibera-
tion to determine if a verdict were possible. When the foreman stated that disagreement
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notes of counsels' arguments;85 statements marked for identification
but never introduced in evidence;36 newspaper articles about the
trial;37 a map not received in evidence;38 a paper on which plaintiff's
attorney had entered his computation of damages;3 unidentified docu-
ments and papers; 0 pleadings;41 a partial transcript of testimony;
42
a flashlight alleged to have caused an explosion;43 and samples of
Communist literature.
44
The rationale behind these decisions is a sensible one, that justice
was done in spite of it all and that the merits of each verdict outweigh
existed on the question of contributory negligence, the court, without objection, reread
its previous instruction on contributory negligence. The jury then retired and within a
few minutes sent word that it wanted the written instruction that had just been read to
them. Over objection by plaintiff's counsel that it would be improper to send a written
instruction to the jury room because this act would focus attention on just the one instruc-
tion, the court complied with the jury's request. Ten minutes later the jury returned with
a verdict for the defendant. On appeal, it was held that the error was collateral and
without probable substantial relation to the disposition of the cause. "Any singling out
of that subject was done by the jury (not by the judge) in the course of their delibera-
tion. Sending the instruction in to them, to be read in the jury room, would not seem to
give this subject any greater emphasis than to have called them into the courtroom (which
would have been proper) for the judge again to read it to them there." 167 Cal. App. 2d
at 509, 334 P.2d at 617.
35 Ferner v. Casalegno, 141 Cal. App. 2d 467, 297 P.2d 91 (1956). These notes
were held "obviously" to be papers authorized by CAL. CODE CrV. Paoc. § 612.
36 Newton v. Thomas, 137 Cal. App. 2d 748, 769, 291 P.2d 503, 515 (1955). In
examining the statements, the appellate court noted "[we] fail to find anything that was
not testified to at the trial."
37 Marshall v. La Boi, 125 Cal. App. 2d 253, 270 P.2d 99 (1954).
3s Balasco v. Chick, 84 Cal. App. 2d 802, 192 P.2d 76 (1948). Cf. Carty v. Boeseke-
Dawe Co., 2 Cal. App. 646, 84 Pac. 267 (1906), holding that the court may properly
refuse to let the jury take a map with them, and People v. Cochran, 61 Cal. 548 (1882),
reaching the same result when counsel unsuccessfully requested that a diagram be sent
to the jury room.
39 Conger v. White, 69 Cal. App. 2d 28, 158 P.2d 415 (1945).
40 People v. Walther, 27 Cal. App. 2d 583, 81 P.2d 452 (1938). Although the judg-
ment of conviction was reversed on other grounds, the appellate court was unimpressed
by an affidavit in defendant's behalf that "certain documents and papers unknown to
this affiant" were delivered to the jury outside of court. In the absence of evidence to the
contrary, the court "must assume" that the jurors and the officer in charge of them were
obedient to the court's admonitions and that the jury rendered the verdict solely on the
evidence adduced in open court. "In support of that presumption we may assume the
documents which were handed to the jurors had no application to the case on trial, or
that they consisted of pleadings or exhibits which had been formally received in evidence
during the progress of the trial. If that is not the fact it would have been easy to intro-
duce evidence of the nature of the documents." 27 Cal. App. 2d at 593, 81 P.2d at 457.
The court does not explain why it would be "easy" to do so.
41 Powley v. Swensen, 146 Cal. 471, 80 Pac. 722 (1905). The practice, however, is
of doubtful propriety.
42 Bleumel v. Kroizy, 113 Cal. App. 585, 298 Pac. 825 (1931). No timely objection
had been raised to the taking of the transcript.
43 Higgins v. Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co., 159 Cal. 651, 115 Pac. 313 (1911).
44 People v. Horiuchi, 114 Cal. App. 415, 300 Pac. 457 (1931).
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its imperfect origin. Conceding agreement with this approach, we
should nevertheless quarrel with several pronouncements:
In a breach of contract action dealing with the purchase of a cus-
tom-built home 45 much of the evidence recounted the luxury features
the buyers had demanded and were reluctant to pay for. As newspa-
pers will, the local press described these frills in sarcastic terms. And
as jurymen often do, some jurors read these accounts during the course
of trial. Against a claim that this behaviour was prejudicial miscon-
duct, the court noted, "If the evidence on these issues was admissible,
and it obviously was, it is difficult to see how a newspaper summary
of such evidence could be prejudicially inflammatory."41 Surely this
statement, standing alone, is nonsense. Journalistic wit has no place
in the jury room. Even if we assume that newspaper accounts will
summarize actual evidence, we need only compare the ways competing
newspapers describe the same events to realize that nothing in the
fourth estate is as flexible as a fact. Litigants should be spared this risk.47
In a fraud action concerned with sales of real property,48 the plain-
tiff's attorney posted a large sheet of paper with his computations of
damages on a courtroom blackboaird. The figures consisted of the sums
in money and property paid by the plaintiff to the defendant, the value
of the property plaintiff received in exchange, interest totals, and 5,000
dollars claimed as exemplary damages. On retiring, a juror took this
paper to the deliberation room. No objection was made until after a
verdict had been returned in the exact amount of these computations.
The appellate court noted that the juror's action was improper but was
done "in full view" of the court, the defendant, the defendant's counsel,
and the plaintiffs counsel. This being so, "It is to be presumed that
the trial court on motion for new trial was of the opinion that the in-
cident was observed by appellant's counsel and that he had an oppor-
tunity to make a timely objection.". 9
Such a presumption, however, wanders beyond the facts and un-
reasonably enlarges the doctrine of waiver. To prevent a party from
sitting back in silence when he knows of a procedural irregularity and
is gambling on a favorable verdict while ready to complain of a hos-
45 Marshall v. La Boi, 125 Cal. App. 2d 253, 270 P.2d 99 (1954).
4Id. at 273, 270 P.2d at 112.
47 See United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361 (1851) and People v. Murray,
94 Cal. 212, 29 Pac. 494 (1892) on the harmless effect of jurors reading newspaper
articles, See Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892) and People v. Chin Non, 146
Cal. 561, 80 Pac. 681 (1905) on the.prejudicial effect of this conduct. See also People v.
McCoy, 71 Cal. 395, 12 Pac. 272 (1886).
48 Conger v. White, 69 Cal. App. 2d 28, 158 P.2d 415 (1945).
40 Id. at 42, 158 P.2d at 423.
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tile one, courts expect an attorney to object as soon as he discovers50
or suspects 5l that the jury has improperly taken certain papers with
them. The present decision, however, seemingly requires an attorney
to monitor the actions of the jury as carefully as he listens to the testi-
mony of witnesses so that he can promptly object to irregularities. He
is impliedly charged with constructive knowledge of whatever the
jury does in open court and is penalized for faulty observation. (The
fact that his client might have observed an impropriety hardly lessens
the attorney's burden. Few clients know what constitutes proper jury
procedure and must either call every bit of jury activity to the attor-
ney's attention or gamble on ignoring a prejudicial act.) The one neu-
tralizing feature that eases this court-imposed vigilance is the statistical
likelihood that opportunities for its application are rare. 5
2
In a prosecution for criminal syndicalisma 3 the jury was mistakenly
permitted to take with it literature that discussed the religious and so-
cial ideas of Communists as well as the Communists' alleged lack of
ideals. The defendants were convicted. On appeal, it was claimed that
the literature might have shocked the sensibilities of the jurors and
that the defendants, not being able to confront the "witnesses" against
them, were deprived of liberty without due process of law. Rejecting
this argument, the appellate court held that since the defendants made
no affirmative showing they were injured by this mistake, no prejudice
would be presumed. The court's bland naivete in a political-criminal
trial might best be judged through a poet's eyes:
"Your innocence is on at such a rakish angle
It gives you quite an air of iniquity."
54
Occasionally, courts find that an irregularity in the taking of papers
to the jury room has prejudiced the losing party. Such a result oc-
curred when, in a sharply contested trial, the jury obtained a deposi-
50 Marshall v. La Boi, 125 Cal. App. 2d 253, 270 P.2d 99 (1954).
51 Newton v. Thomas, 137 Cal. App. 2d 748, 291 P.2d 503 (1955).
52 But see Kershaw v. Tilbury, 214 Cal. 679, 8 P.2d 109 (1932), in which the court
said that if a juror falls asleep during the trial and a party notices this fact, it is his duty
to notify his attorney who should call the court's attention to this conduct. A party's fail-
ure to do so is a waiver of the objection. "It does not behoove a litigant to observe an
error being committed and sit idly by and not mention it to his attorney or the court."
214 Cal. at 691, 8 P.2d at 114. See also Newman v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 120 Cal.
App. 2d 685, 262 P.2d 95 (1953), which states that before an appellant may urge a juror's
dereliction (here, the alleged sleeping of two jurors through most of the trial) as a ground
for reversal or new trial, he must affirmatively show that neither he nor his counsel had
knowledge of this fact before the case was submitted.
53 People v. Horiuchi, 114 Cal. App. 415, 300 Pac. 457 (1931).
54 Fay, Tim LADY's NOT FOR BURNING, Act I (1953).
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tion that was extremely damaging to the defendant. 55 The appellate
court declared:56
Permitting the jury to have this isolated portion of the evidence, con-
trary to the provisions of the statute (Code of Civil Procedure section
612), centered its attention on the Steffan testimony, stressing the
importance of this one item and exalting it above all other evidence
given at the trial. The obvious result of such procedure could well
be that the verdict for plaintiff was based upon this deposition rather
than upon a proper consideration of all evidence placed before the
jury.
What minimizes this result, however, is the fact that the trial court
had granted a new trial when the misconduct was called to his atten-
tion. In rendering its decision, the appellate court had only to affirm
that the trial court did not thereby abuse his discretion. Later cases
based on the same irregularity show that "although the taking of a
deposition into the jury room is erroneous, the question of whether it
constitutes ground for a new trial or a reversal is one addressed to the
sound discretion of the court."5 7 This language, though strong, is some-
what misleading. Appellate courts recognize that a document's con-
tents can be independently examined at each judicial level with equal
facility. Unlike situations in which the demeanor of a witness carries
great impact, situations involving written material give the trial court
no analytic advantage over his more elevated brethren. Accordingly,
the higher court appears to base its decision on a study of the improp-
erly-used documents, taking into account the contents and the rela-
tionship of the document to the major issues at trial. For depositions
alleged as the basis of prejudicial misconduct, courts are likely to pre-
serve the verdict if the deposition is substantially identical to the testi-
mony of the witness as given on the stand. 58 No more felicitous
technique suggests itself.
Evidence, Experience, and Experiments
Jurors are expected to reach a verdict based on the evidence ad-
mitted at trial and interpreted by their own common knowledge. The
555 Brandwein v. Rodriquez, 133 Cal. App. 2d 433, 284 P.2d 130 (1955).
56 Id. at 436, 284 P.2d at 132.
57Davenport v. Waite, 175 Cal. App. 2d 623, 628, 346 P.2d 501, 504 (1959); Quir-
ing v. Zamboni, 148 Cal. App. 2d 890, 307 P.2d 650 (1957). See also Cockerill v. Hall,
76 Cal. 192, 18 Pac. 318 (1888), holding that promissory notes detached from a deposi-
tion are properly taken into the jury room even though the deposition, which could not
be so taken, proved certain matters about the notes. "If the witness had been produced
and had identified the notes, and proved their execution and given their history, and they
were thereupon admitted in evidence, it could not be contended that they were part of
the testimony of the witness. They could in such case be taken by the jury upon retir-
ing." 76 Cal. at 196, 18 Pac. at 320.
58 See Davenport v. Waite and Quiring v. Zamboni, supra note 57.
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common knowledge must not supply testimony, as would occur if a
jury acted on its private information about a particular fact, but must
be used only to aid them in understanding what competent evidence
signifies.
Indeed, no evidence in any case would be intelligible if neither the
judge nor jury could see and understand it in the light of common
experience.... Of course, the common knowledge of one jury might
be very different from that of another; but no definite rule as to what
is common knowledge can be made. The more intelligent the juror
the better he will apply common knowledge in the understanding of
testimony and in making proper deductions and inferences there-
from.5 9
Regulating these boundless possibilities of ignorance, information,
and delusion, which shift with each turn of the jury selection wheel,
is a task that links law with epistemology, trial procedure with the
theory of the method and grounds of knowledge. Two early California
cases simplify one aspect of the problem by focusing attention on a
jury's traveling away from the courtroom to view premises referred
to in testimony.
According to Wright v. Carpenter,6" an instruction is erroneous
if it authorizes the jury to take into consideration the results of their
own examination of the premises. Code of Civil Procedure section 610,
which permits these views, did not intend to convert the jurors into
"silent witnesses" who could base their verdict on their own inspection
tour regardless of an overwhelming weight of evidence to the contrary.
There would be no way to ascertain the value or accuracy of an opin-
ion based on such personal observations. The purpose of section 610,
said the court, was to enable the jury to more clearly "understand and
apply" the evidence. Under such a decision, juries serve as receptacles
for evidence rather than as repositories of knowledge.
Though Wright was decided three years after section 610 was
passed, and might therefore be credited with some perception of leg-
islative insight, the California Supreme Court, in People v. Milner,61
soon noted that this interpretation had already been "set aside" before
1898. Why? Because a view is similar to an evaluation of real evidence
that is physically present in court. A door with a hole in it could be
59 Kawamura v. Honek, 127 Cal. App. 509, 511, 512, 16 P.2d 150, 151 (1932), hold-
ing that in a determination of plaintiff's life expectancy, when plaintiff neither introduced
testimony as to his age, health, or family history, nor introduced "life tables," the jury
could take the testimony given them, including its own view of the plaintiff and his de-
meanor, and with the aid of common knowledge approximate his age and life expectancy.
60 49 Cal. 607 (1875).
61 122 Cal. 171, 54 Pac. 833 (1898), a criminal trial, with the view authorized under
CAL. PEN. CODE § 1181(2).
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received in evidence and submitted to the jury to determine whether
the hole was caused by a bullet. If, instead of bringing the door to
the jury, the jury was brought to the door, would it be any less the
reception of evidence because obtained in this way? Jurors, al fresco
or not, were permitted to add some increment of their own wisdom
to the facts adduced at trial.
Nowadays the knowledge that a jury acquires by an authorized
view is considered independent evidence in the case, properly used in
arriving at a verdict. 2 Because "the practice is a dangerous one, as is
well known to the profession," 3 the trial judge has discretion in deter-
mining whether the jury should be permitted to view the premises.64
The court's discretion extends to a determination, explicit or im-
plicit, on whether the jury's misconduct during an authorized view is
prejudicial. Even though the judge forewarns the jury, "I think it is
better for you not to discuss it (the situation at the scene of the acci-
dent) among yourselves," and counsel makes a timely objection that
the jurors were "scattered and separate," talking to each other, and
pointing out various physical objects, an appellate court will not dis-
turb the trial court's implied finding, in denying a motion for new trial,
that these events were harmless.65 Violations of the trial court's in-
structions are measured according to the magnitude of the violation.
Assuming that some jurors have improperly received evidence out of
court by examining street car brakes during a view of the crossing
where an accident occurred, "was it important enough to warrant a
62 Neel v. Mannings, Inc., 19 Cal. 2d 647, 122 P.2d 576 (1942); Gates v. McKinnon,
18 Cal. 2d 179, 114 P.2d 576 (1941), in which the trier of fact was a judge sitting with-
out a jury; Downey v. Santa Fe Transp. Co., 134 Cal. App. 2d 720, 286 P.2d 40 (1955),
reversing a judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the trial court erred in deter-
mining there was no evidence giving substantial support to the jury verdict for plaintiff.
The evidence at trial, together with the jury's view of the premises, can farnish substantial
evidence to support an implied finding of defendant's negligence.
63 Brown v. Lemon Cove Ditch Co., 36 Cal. App. 94, 100, 171 Pac. 705, 708 (1918).
04 CAL. CODE COr. Pgoc. § 610; Trust v. Arden Farms Co., 50 Cal. 2d 217, 324 P.2d
583 (1958); Henley v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 166 Cal. App. 2d 554, 333 P.2d 388
(1958), holding that no abuse of discretion is shown when the court properly instructs the
jury that changes made since the accident are to be disregarded; Laguna Salada Elemen-
tary School Dist. v. Pacific-Dev. Co., 119 Cal. App. 2d 470, 259 P.2d 498 (1953); Frei-
bury v. Israel, 45 Cal. App. 138, 187 Pac. 130 (1919), holding that there is no error in
permitting the jury to view a damaged buggy about one year after the accident when
witnesses, who are subject to cross-examination, testify the buggy is in substantially the
same condition at the time the jury viewed it as it was immediately after the accident.
See also Judd v. Letts, 158 Cal. 359, 111 Pac. 12 (1910), holding that a juror's expression
of a desire to view the premises is not prejudicial misconduct.
65 MacPherson v. West Coast Transit Co., 94 Cal. App. 463, 271 Pac. 509 (1928).
Counsel's affidavits in this case did not disclose the actual conversations the jurors carried
on with each other.
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reversal?"6 If no one has claimed anything was wrong with the brakes
or the brake mechanism, nor alleged that the accident was due to any
defect in the brakes, the improperly received evidence is immaterial
to any real issue in the case. No prejudice arises from such mis-
conduct.6 7
Leading from this situation is a side road concerned with the role
of the judge during an authorized view. Two irreconcilable prece-
dents, one criminal and one civil, may be called on to answer the
question, "Must the trial judge accompany the jury on these excur-
sions?" In a late 19th century criminal prosecution,6" the judge's fail-
ure to join the jury at the scene of a homicide was held reversible
error. More recently, a civil case 69 acknowledged the existence of this
holding, but refused to apply the earlier result. "The failure of a judge
to perform his duty and accompany the jury when it views the prem-
ises, should not be encouraged .... We expressly hold it to be im-
proper, but we cannot say under the circumstances of this case that
defendant was prejudiced by such failure." 70
Unless the complaining party can affirmatively show substantial
irregularity in the jury's conduct, the judge's absence, as such, appears
to be small cause for reversal. More sophisticated and more trouble-
some, however, is the effect of this absence on the judge's qualifications
to pass on later motions directed to the sufficiency of the evidence. If
the jury, but not the judge, visit the scene of the accident and watch
a driving demonstration from an office where a witness allegedly ob-
served the accident, is the judge properly acting within his discretion
when he grants a new trial on defendant's motion that the evidence
was insufficient to support the verdict? Yes, he is, declares a 1947 deci-
sion of the district court of appeals. 7 ' Having heard all the testimony,
observed the witnesses, and seen the maps and photographs received
in evidence, the judge is in a position to weigh and consider the pos-
sibility and probability that defendant's vehicle was driven in the
manner alleged by plaintiff. Although he should have been with the
00 Kimic v. San Jose-Los Gatos Ry., 156 Cal. 379, 398, 104 Pac. 986, 994 (1909).
13 Ibid. When the jury approached the scene of the accident in this case, one juror
said, "That is the way Kimic was injured; if the tracks were wet he could not have stopped
his car before said crossing." This statement, according to the court, does not show a
"prejudiced mind." As a statement made on the spur of the moment and based on an
irrelevant fact, it could not ultimately have affected the minds of intelligent jurors, even
though it violated the court's admonition that the jury should not discuss the case.
08 People v. Yut Ling, 74 Cal. 569, 16 Pac. 489 (1888). The judge's absence was the
sole ground for reversal.
69 Rau v. Redwood City Women's Club, 111 Cal. App. 2d 546, 245 P.2d 12 (1952).
Id. at 555, 245 P.2d at 17, 18.
71 Haley v. Bay Cities Transit Co., 82 Cal. App. 2d 950, 187 P.2d 850 (1947). The
judge's absence, in itself, was not urged as an irregularity.
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jury, his failure in this regard does not prevent him from exercising
his discretion in passing on the motion.
A decision of this nature renders worthless the jury's evaluation of
the physical environment in which the disputed event took place, nulli-
fies what might be called the "demeanor of the landscape." If the trial
judge had believed that, at best, plaintiff did not-and could not-
sustain the burden of proof to establish defendant's fault, he should
have granted the defendant judgment notwithstanding the verdict. In
such a case, we could reasonably assume that the judge allotted the
jury's view its greatest possible weight and still found the plaintiff
wanting. But by granting the motion for new trial, the judge implies
that plaintiff can successfully prove his case before another judge and
jury, and can do so with the same evidence marshalled at the first
trial. Given this possibility of plaintiff's future success, the judge
should recognize that through his own fault he put the jury in a better
position that himself to evaluate the facts. He should not, when pass-
ing on the motion for new trial, act as a "thirteenth juror" if his cre-
dentials are so impaired. In reviewing the judge's action, the appellate
court should insist that the judge's discretion be no broader than his
qualifications to judge. The granting of a new trial in these circum-
stances would then be considered an abuse of discretion.72
Irregularities present in authorized views have also been found
in unauthorized views, when one or more members of the jury decide
to see for themselves what all the testimony is about. Such "officious
conduct" is readily condemned, 73 but is judged within the perspective
of the whole trial. If the misconduct is of so trifling a nature that it
could not have been prejudicial to the losing party, then the improper
view does not justify a new trial.74 The philosophy of applying the
72 Cf. Downey v. Santa Fe Transp. Co., 134 Cal. App. 2d 720, 286 P.2d 40 (1955).
73 Maffeo v. Holmes, 47 Cal. App. 2d 292, 117 P.2d 948 (1941). Because of a rule
excluding certain affidavits made by jurors to impeach their verdict, the improper action
of two jurors was not here available as a ground for reversing the judgment.
74 Siemsen v. Oakland, S.L. & H. Elec. Ry., 134 Cal. 494, 66 Pac. 672 (1901), revers-
ing the trial court's granting of defendant's motion for new trial. Where a dispute exists
over the location of an accident, or the scene's exact condition has an essential bearing on
the controversy, it may well be that a verdict should be set aside on proof that a juror
improperly acquired knowledge by visiting the scene. But if the place of the accident
and the fact that a street car ran off its track are not disputed, and there is no allegation
that the ear left the track because of defective rails or road bed, there is an insufficient
showing to justify a new trial on the basis of an affidavit that a juror was observed be-
tween the tracks "seemingly" examining them. See Kollert v. Cundiff, 50 Cal. 2d 768, 774,
329 P.2d 897, 1900 (1958), rejecting jurors' affidavits but noting, "With respect to the
foreman's visit to the scene of the accident and his report to the jury it is difficult to see
how, in the light of the evidence relating to the collision, the duration of the traffic signals
could have had a significant bearing on the outcome of the case." Higgins v. Los Angeles
Gas & Elec. Co., 159 Cal. 651, 115 Pac. 313 (1911), holding that no error resulted from
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same standards to a jury's conduct, whether originally authorized or
not, appears perfectly compatible with the sound administration of
justice. No reason exists to punish a litigant for the jury's wrongs
unless the litigant benefited from the misconduct.
An example of prejudicial misconduct is a case75 where two jurors
during a court recess inspected the motorcycle on which plaintiff was
riding at the time of the disputed accident. The motorcycle was not
then in evidence but, examining it all the same, one juror said to the
other that plaintiff's wife could not have seen the speedometer from
where she was sitting on the rear seat when the accident occurred.
After judgment for defendant, the plaintiff, moving for a new trial,
presented affidavits that the speedometer was not in the same position
during the unauthorized examination as it was at the time of the acci-
dent, and that no evidence was introduced to show the speedometer's
position before the accident. The lower court's action in granting the
motion was affirmed on appeal. Not only were the jurors taking evi-
dence out of court without the parties' knowledge, but the improperly
received evidence was along new lines which the plaintiff had no op-
portunity to explain or refute. Misconduct of this nature affects sub-
stantial rights and is the proper basis for a new trial.
Closely allied to the view as sources of information are experi-
ments, which are often proper, and private research, which is always
criticized. Private research takes several forms, from measuring a map
during a court recess (irregular but not prejudicial) , 6 to checking on
the value of electroencephalograms and on the reputation, background,
and qualifications of the medical witnesses (irregular but not preju-
dicial) ,77 to telephoning a private physician about whether 190 is a
dangerous blood pressure (irregular and prejudicial) .7  As usual, the
relationship of the improperly received information to the total case
determines the appellate result. When a juror, by soliciting an outside
source, receives information directly bearing on a principal issue over
the sheriff's having conducted the jury to lunch past the building in which a disputed
explosion had occurred. The jury's casual visit to the scene of the event, as when taking
exercise under an officer's custody, is no ground for setting aside a verdict.
,5 Tunmore v. MacLeish, 45 Cal. App. 266, 187 Pac. 443 (1919).
76 Wilson v. California Cab Co., 125 Cal. App. 383, 13 P.2d 758 (1932). The map
in question had been admitted in evidence, but the jurors' action violated the court's
instruction not to discuss the case until final submission.
77 Schouten v. Crawford, 118 Cal. App. 2d 59, 65, 257 P.2d 88, 92 (1953). "While
the juror undoubtedly violated the court's admonition, it is clear that his conduct was not
prejudicial since it dealt with matters touching the character and extent of plaintiff's
injuries and the reliability of witnesses testifying on such matters. Such testimony, how-
ever, never became crucial since the jury came to the conclusion that plaintiff was not
entitled to recover." A question of waiver was also resolved against the plaintiff.
78 Walter v. Ayvazian, 134 Cal. App. 360, 25 P.2d 526 (1933).
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which qualified expert witnesses had differed, this "reprehensible con-
duct" justifies a reversal of the judgment. Reliance on the expert opin-
ion of a man whom the juror trusted, as opposed to the testimony of
strangers under oath, cannot meet the required standards of fairness
in the rendition of a just verdict uninfluenced by outside considera-
tions. 79
Experiments, when properly conducted, occupy a legitimate place
in jury deliberations. On a rudimentary and rather obvious level, a jury
may subject a memorandum book, previously introduced in evidence,
to inspection under a mechanical device-a magnifying glass-for the
purpose of investigating and comparing samples of handwriting.80 But
since the jury must not investigate the case outside the courtroom,
it is prejudicially improper for some jurors to borrow a rifle like the
one which killed the deceased and, by firing it, try to determine the
range at which powder marks would be carried.81 A working principle
to guide such jury curiosity has been established by the California
Supreme Court in reversing the grant of a new trial for alleged jury
misconduct: 
82
The court may permit the jury to take with them and use in their
deliberations any exhibit where the circumstances call for it, observ-
ing the proper precaution of instructing the jury in the nature of the
use which they shall make of the exhibit.... They may use the ex-
hibit according to its nature to aid them in weighing the evidence
which has been given and in reaching a conclusion upon a contro-
verted matter. They may carry out experiments within the lines of
offered evidence, but if their experiments shall invade new fields and
they shall be influenced in their verdict by discoveries from such ex-
periments which will not fall fairly within the scope and purview of
the evidence, then, manifestly, the jury has been taking evidence
without the knowledge of either party, evidence which it is not pos-
sible for the party injured to meet, answer, or explain.
Could this sensible rule have been made available in Marinucci v.
Bryant,88 the lower court's judgment would undoubtedly have been
reversed because of prejudicial jury experiments. Marinucci, which
70 Id. But of. Kritzer v. Citron, 101 Cal. App. 2d 33, 224 P.2d 808
(1950), which held that Walter v. Ayvazian, supra, was not controlling because in the
present case, unlike Walter, the offending juror did not communicate the results of her
private investigation to her fellow jurors.
0 In re Thomas' Estate, 155 Cal. 488, 101 Pac. 798 (1909), a will forgery case. See
CAL. CODE Crv. Pnoc. §1944.
81 People v. Conkling, 111 Cal. 616, 44 Pac. 314 (1896). The jurors here were
considered honest and desirous of getting at the truth, but too zealous in their work.
82 Higgins v. Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co., 159 Cal. 651, 656-57, 115 Pac. 313, 315
(1911).
83 151 Cal. App. 2d 298, 311 P.2d 622 (1957).
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turned on the use of incompetent affidavits to impeach a verdict,
s
4
nevertheless demands some attention from legal scholars anxious to
grasp the foundation of a jury's knowledge. Three litigants partici-
pated in this case: the plaintiff, who was also the cross-defendant; the
defendant husband; and the cross-complainant wife. To initiate the
controversy, plaintiff had approached the wife in a bar and "pinched
her where she sat, which caused her to jump, but not to arise."85 Hus-
band thereupon struck plaintiff, who, loser in combat, took to the
law and emerged victorious against the husband and, on her cross-
complaint, against the wife. The wife appealed with affidavits showing
that on the first day of their deliberations, some women jurors had
pinched other women jurors or had pinched themselves (but no male
jurors had a hand in these proceedings). On the next day, the jurors
searched for black and blue marks in the abused area. Finding none,
they decided against the wife's claim.
Though refusing to reverse the judgment, the appellate court
agreed with the wife that these experiments were highly improper and
incompetent because "no comparison can be drawn between a puny
pinch administered by one woman juror to another and the surrepti-
tious squeeze of a stimulated steelworker in a bar room ... "86
Improper Communications
Jurors often indulge in conversations with each other, with counsel
for one of the parties, with court officers, with the judge, or with
strangers. These conversations, however innocent in tone or remote
from the controversy at issue, nevertheless intrude an element of pos-
sible unfairness in the jury's verdict. According to an older decision
of the United States Supreme Court, "Private communications, pos-
sibly prejudicial, between jurors and third persons, or witnesses, or
the officer in charge, are absolutely forbidden, and invalidate the ver-
dict, at least unless their harmlessness is made to appear."8' . This lan-
guage, though probably still valid as a bold statement of principle, has
been diluted by a liberal interpretation of what conduct is harmless.
So, for example, no misconduct is registered when a witness, employed
by defendant, meets two jurors at a drinking fountain, smiles, shrugs
his shoulders, and comments, "Now you see what we have to cope
84 See text at notes 143-65.
85 151 Cal. App. 2d at 300, 311 P.2d at 623.
86 Id. at 306, 311 P.2d at 627.
87 Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 150 (1892), reversing a murder conviction.
In this case, the bailiff told the jury during their deliberations that, among other things,
the present victim was the "third fellow" the defendant had killed.
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with";s8 nor when one of several jurors standing in the hallway, as a
prelude to a few "bantering" remarks, tells the plaintiff's attorney that
he resembles a motion picture actor;8 9 nor when a juror, speaking out
from the jury box as counsel is about to offer a bumper in evidence,
remarks, "he can sell that for a fee."90
The statement last quoted may have been made by one juror for
his colleagues, and not deliberately addressed to outsiders. Regardless
of this possibility, the conduct is still improper since jurors must not
talk with each other about a case before it is finally submitted,91 nor
form or express an opinion on the controversy until that time. 2 As the
attorney should expect from an acquaintanceship with other courtroom
irregularities, this occurrence is harmless when the statement could
not have improperly influenced the verdict.
93
In charging misconduct based on intra-jury conversations, the com-
plaining party takes on a difficult enterprise. With juror affidavits
unavailable to impeach the verdict,9 4 his best means of determining
what Juror A said to Juror B. before submission is the evidence of an
outsider who observed the dialogue. An affidavit similar to the follow-
ing one, made by a private investigator who was seated about ten feet
from the jury, appears to contain as much information as could be
expected under ordinary conditions, and yet was disregarded. The
8s Aspen Pictures, Inc. v. Oceanic S.S. Co., 148 Cal. App. 2d 238, 306 P.2d 933
(1957).
s8 Happoldt v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 90 Cal. App. 2d 386, 203 P.2d
55 (1949). The incident was considered "inconsequential."
D0 Sepulveda v. Ishimaru, 149 Cal. App. 2d 543, 308 P.2d 809 (1957). This deci-
sion may have been based on the attorney's waiver of his right to complain. On a related
point, the court held that no prejudice resulted from the fact that a daughter of one of
the jurors talked to the defendant in the ladies' restroom, wished her good luck, and later
sat next to her in the courtroom where, presumably, the juror observed this proximity. It
is "not clear how this fact can have influenced the mother unless the daughter then and
there spoke to the defendant or in other ways showed that she was associating with the
defendant or sympathized with her. The affidavit does not state anything of the kind, nor
does it indicate how long the daughter sat next to the defendant. The fact alone that a
person for some undefined length of time sits next to a party in a law suit does not nec-
essarily have any meaning with respect to the relations or sentiments existing between
them. The probable effect on the juror of the in itself inconclusive happening was again
a question of fact primarily for the trial court whose implied decision that it did not affect
the mother we shall not disturb." 149 Cal. App. 2d at 547-48, 308 P.2d at 812.
91 See Monaghan v. Pacific Rolling Mill Co., 81 Cal. 190, 22 Pac. 590 (1889).
92 See CAL. CODE Crv. PRoc. § 611. The statute specifically refers to the jurors'
conduct during a separation but should reasonably apply with equal force when the jury
is kept together.
93 See Kimic v. San Jose-Los Gatos Ry., 156 Cal. 379, 104 Pac. 986 (1909); Mona-
ghan v. Pacific Rolling Mill Co., 81 Cal. 190, 22 Pac. 590 (1889); Williams v. Layne, 53
Cal. App. 2d 81, 127 P.2d 582 (1942) (dictum). Cf. Tunmore v. MacLeish, 45 Cal.
App. 266, 187 Pac. 443 (1919).
9' See text at notes 143-65.
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investigator stated in part that he observed two jurors conversing
while testimony was being given: 95
I could plainly see from their actions and manner of conversing that
they were very unfavorable to the defense in this action; that when-
ever any objections was [sic] overruled by the court that had been
introduced by the defense they appeared to be satisfied, smiled and
said something to each other; that I could plainly tell from their
manner that they were talking together about this case and that their
actions indicated clearly that they were unfavorable to the defense.
. . . That I could plainly tell by the actions of the two jurors men-
tioned that they appeared to be more opposed to the defense of this
action, indicating to me that they had formed an opinion before the
case was submitted to them.
Since this affidavit lacked statements revealing the language used
by the jurors or describing the nature of their objectionable actions,
the court concluded that it must be disregarded "as merely a recital of
the conclusions arising in the mind of the affiant."96 Granted that the
affidavit contains more conclusions than "brute facts," how much detail
may a court legitimately expect when the affiant, by definition, is a
stranger to the conversation? According to hornbook law,97 the opin-
ions of lay witnesses are admissible on the following matters, among
others: the apparent state of feelings or the nature of relations appar-
ently existing between persons, and an individual's appearance, ac-
tions, and apparent physical, mental, or emotional conditions and
characteristics. Admissibility of these opinions9s
. . . is a matter of necessity or expediency, for it frequently happens
that it is impossible for a witness to detail all the pertinent facts in
such a manner as to enable the jury to form a conclusion without a
statement of the witness's opinion. Indeed, the witness may not be
able to separate the facts which form the basis of his conclusion from
the conclusion itself.
If the courts wish to enforce the prohibitions against intra-jury con-
versations about the trial, allowances should be made for the problems
in obtaining this information. An affidavit with "opinion-facts" should
95 Smith v. Brown, 102 Cal. App. 477, 482-83, 283 Pac. 132, 134 (1929). A ques-
tion of waiver was also considered here, seemingly as a judicial afterthought.
96 Id. at 483, 283 Pac. at 134. The court's use of "merely" brings into focus an in-
cident from VIERICK & ELDRIDCE, MY FMST Two THOUSAND YEARS 248 (Crest ed. 1956).
The book's fictional hero has just astounded the court of Frederick the Great with his
universal knowledge.
"Voltaire grumbled. 'Mere memory, Your Majesty.'
"Frederick laughed. 'Do not mind Monsieur de Voltaire, Prince. He scorns every
art in which he is not proficient. He says "mere king" with equal glibness.'"
97 2 JONES, EVIDENCE § 405 (5th ed. 1958).
98 Id. § 404.
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be accepted as prima facie evidence which the other party can (and
should) meet by counter-affidavits from the accused jurors99 or by
other appropriate means.
For conversations between jurors and third persons, problems of
proof are easier. Yet even when the unauthorized conversation takes
place between a juror and a party's attorney, with a direct bearing on
the case (e.g., the juror asking about a map that had been introduced
in evidence, and the attorney answering that certain testimony covered
the subject 100), the event may be harmless. Recognizing that counsel
"should at all times be solicitous to preserve not only the substance
of justice, but every appearance of propriety, and should keep away
from jurors during recesses and should have no conversation with them
beyond the usual salutations," the court still appreciates the attorney's
desire to be courteous. If the juror precipitates the conversation and
the attorney tries to answer without being discourteous and without
supplying new information, no prejudice results to the other party.' 0 '
Bailiffs, as the intermediaries between the jury and the court, fre-
quently become entangled in controversies over whether a particular
message is an improper communication. In the often-cited and often-
differentiated case of Nelson v. Southern Pac.,102 the appellate court
stated it was an "improper irregularity" for the trial court, in the ab-
sence of counsel, to communicate with the jury after their retirement
by sending them a message through the bailiff. Discussing this and
other irregularities, but never describing the improperly sent message,
the appellate court finally held that the "sum" of the errors justified a
reversal. Later cases withstood the claim that Nelson required a new
trial whenever this type of irregularity was established. "It is true,"
said one court, "that any communication sent to the jury in the ab-
sence of counsel or without their express stipulation is irregular and
the practice is one to be avoided."1oa California Code of Civil Proce-
99 Jurors' affidavits are admissible to disprove or explain the alleged misconduct. See
Kimic v. San Jose-Los Gatos Ry., 156 Cal. 379, 104 Pac. 312 (1909). Cf. Kritzer v. Cit-
ron, 101 Cal. App. 2d 33, 224 P.2d 808 (1950); and see text at note 156.
1g Maaskant v. Matsui, 50 Cal. App. 2d 819, 123 P.2d 853 (1942).
101 50 Cal. App. 2d at 826, 123 P.2d at 857. Accord, Dimmick, v. Alvarez, 196 Cal.
App. 2d 215, 16 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1961), holding that a few words spoken between an
attorney and a juror does not in itself amount to prejudicial misconduct. See also Inger-
son v. Truebody, 40 Cal. 603 (1871), holding that the "mere" fact that a juror prema-
turely disclosed the verdict to the winning party does not invalidate the verdict, unless
damage or fraudulent conduct is shown.
1028 Cal. 2d 648, 67 P.2d 682 (1937).
103 Tice v. Pacific Elec. fy., 36 Cal. App. 2d 66, 72, 73, 96 P.2d 1022, 1025 (1939).
Here, the jury sent a message through the bailiff asking whether a verdict could be re-
turned in favor of only one plaintiff. The judge replied by sending the following allegedly-
prejudicial writing to the jury: "Yes, they may decide in favor of one plaintiff and not in
favor of the other." See also Kritzer v. Citron, 101 Cal. App. 2d 33, 224 P.2d 808 (1950).
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dure section 614, on returning the jury to the courtroom for additional
information, should have been observed. But if the court's communi-
cation does not prejudice the complaining party, nor contain state-
ments calculated to mislead the jury in any respect, the error does not
require a new trial.1
0 4
Under California Constitution article VI section 41/2, which says
that a judgment should not be reversed unless a miscarriage of justice
has been caused, the complaining party has the burden of making an
affirmative showing that prejudice resulted, unless the prejudice is re-
vealed on the face of the record. The irregular communication, to be
prejudicial, must have a "probable substantial relation to the disposi-
tion of the cause." Where error is relied on to invoke the court's power
to reverse a judgment, it has been stated that:10 5
It is not sufficient for appellant to point out the error and rest there.
Since the appellate court must affirmatively find prejudice such find-
ing must be based either upon the facts found in the record or upon
the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. In the face of the
constitutional limitation there is no room for the presumption that
prejudice results from the fact of error alone. The fact of prejudice is
just as essential as the fact of error.
The Role of the Judge in Jury Deliberations
As a guide to what a judge expects of a jury, and therefore as an
insight into his conduct when the jurors have difficulty in arriving at
a verdict, a classic instruction by Judge Robert C. Pitman of Massachu-
setts should be examined. Addressing a jury on their general duties,
Judge Pitman said:1 °G
104 Tice v. Pacific Elec. Ry., supra note 103. The majority in Tice cited Soukoian v.
Cadillac Taxi Co., 68 Cal. App. 604, 229 Pac. 1015 (1924) as supporting the same posi-
tion-which it does, though it is a district court of appeal decision rendered before the
supreme court decided Nelson. A dissenting judge in Tice argued that the lower court's
procedure was improper and that the requirement for proper procedure is not a "so-called
technical rule." 36 Cal. App. 2d at 76, 96 P.2d at 1026.
105 Santina v. General Petr. Corp., 41 Cal. App. 2d 74, 77, 106 P.2d 60, 62 (1940).
Accord, Chambers v. Southern Pac., 148 Cal. App. 2d 873, 307 P.2d 662 (1957).
106 WILLARD, HALF A CENTURY WITH JUDGES AND LAWYERS 123 (1895). See also
Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896), a criminal case in which it was held proper
for the court to give an instruction after they interrupted their deliberations to return to
court. "While, undoubtedly, the verdict of the jury should represent the opinion of each
individual juror, it by no means follows that opinions may not be changed by conference
in the juryroom. The very object of the jury system is to secure unanimity by a com-
parison of views and by arguments among the jurors themselves. It certainly cannot be
the law that each juror should not listen with deference to the arguments and with a
distrust of his own judgment, if he finds a large majority of the jury taking a different
view of the case from what he does himself. It cannot be that each juror should go to
the juryroom with a blind determination that the verdict shall represent his opinion of
the case at the moment; or that he should close his ears to the arguments of men who
are equally honest and intelligent as himself." 164 U.S. at 501-02.
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Gentlemen, there may be large cases, and there may be small; some
five dollars, and some five thousand dollars, and the law does not
presume that, however difficult a case may be, a jury is not to agree,
and keep the parties in misery, and support an army of lawyers dur-
ing their natural lives; but you come here to agree and settle the case
in which the parties are in dispute.
This philosophy, coupled with the jury's right to further enlighten-
ment under California Code of Civil Procedure section 614 and Penal
Code section 1138, often stimulates a judge to aid, coax,107 or allegedly
coerce a divided twelve into making a decision. When he takes action
in this regard, complaints about his conduct usually arise in three
major categories, dealing with the rereading of evidence, the regiving
of previously given instructions or the giving of new instructions, and
the use of "pressure" to induce agreement.
1 0 8
So far as the rereading of evidence is concerned, no prejudicial
error occurs if the court permits only a partial reading of certain testi-
mony under facts which show that the jury returned to court, asked
to hear the testimony, and announced their desires were satisfied be-
fore the testimony was completed. If a party thinks the selection is an
inadequate response to the jury's request, he should ask for the reading
of other relevant and material testimony at that time.10 9 In other sit-
uations, when the court refuses a proper request for a rereading of
testimony, his action is erroneous and probably-but not necessarily-
prejudicial. One district court of appeal decisionilo has observed that
a trial judge, who knew from the jury's messages they were confused
1r See, e.g., Pisani v. Martini, 132 Cal. App. 269, 22 P.2d 804 (1933), holding
there is no misconduct when, after the jury announces they cannot agree on a verdict,
the trial court suggests they retire for further deliberations. Without indicating how the
case should be decided and without intimidation or coercion, the judge stated that the
case had been well tried and was one in which an agreement should be reached. The
judge then asked if the jury could not agree "by talking the matter over." A juror replied,
"We might try." Try they did, and reached the verdict sustained on appeal.
208 For examples outside those categories, see Marinucci v. Bryant, 151 Cal. App. 2d
298, 311 P.2d 622 (1957), holding a judge may properly make the litigants rise when the
jury returns to court so that a confused juror could identify the "cross-complainants" and
"cross-defendant"; and Soukoian v. Cadillac Taxi Co., 68 Cal. App. 604, 229 Pac. 1015
(1924), holding no prejudicial error arises when the judge, on reading the verdict handed
to him, tells the foreman that the verdict must not include costs and attorneys' fees, and
sends the jury back for further deliberations.
109 Duncan v. J. H. Corder & Son, 18 Cal. App. 2d 77, 62 P.2d 1387 (1936). See
Hughes v. Wheeler, 76 Cal. 230, 18 Pac. 386 (1888), holding that if the record does not
show what testimony was reread to the jury, it is impossible to ascertain that the testi-
mony had any prejudicial effect on the jury. "Error must be affirmatively shown by the
record."
110 James v. Key System Transit Lines, 125 Cal. App. 2d 278, 270 P.2d 116 (1954).
Here the jury did not specifically request a reading of the transcript, but its action could
reasonably have been interpreted only as such a request.
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about a deposition, should have brought them into the courtroom and
ascertained what they wanted from the document. The appellate court
declared: "'
If on returning to the courtroom the jury asked for more than it was
entitled to have read, the judge could, of course, limit it to that to
which it was entitled. But to refuse to inform it of its rights in this
respect, when the judge was, in effect, informed that the jury was in
difficulty in some way about the deposition, clearly prevented a fair
trial.... (Emphasis added.)
The omission marks, like the italics, belong to the author and not to
the appellate court. Had the court stopped here, its reasoning would
have led it to reverse the judgment (which was based on a ten to two
verdict) and order a new trial. Unfortunately, the italicized quotation
actually ends in this manner: "clearly prevented a fair trial, unless the
matters in the deposition were inconsequential." Because the deposi-
tion did not substantially contradict the plaintiff's testimony and did
not affect his credibility, and because the court found nothing "which
in any reasonable probability would have caused any of the jurors to
vote differently than they did,"' 12 the judgment was affirmed. A more
respectful approach to the jury system was registered the following
year, after a trial judge had notified the jury that their request for a
rereading of testimony could not be granted because the court re-
porter was ill.1 13 On appeal, the court reversed the resulting judgment:
"Whether the outcome or the verdict would have been any different
is beside the issue. The verdict was 9 to 3. In the circumstances, the
action of the trial judge must be held, as a matter of law, to have been
prejudicial.""'4
A jury conscientious enough to seek aid through proper channels
should be given wholehearted assistance from the trial judge. If he
refuses this help-and the appellate court excuses the dereliction-how
can jurors then be expected to obey the niceties of legal conduct?
The problem of reinstructions is another area giving the parties
cause for alarm. When the jury returns to court specifically asking to
hear a particular instruction, the party whom the instruction may in-
jure is likely to claim that a rereading of instructions on one subject
diverts the jury's attention from the real issue in the case and preju-
dicially affects the party's rights. Despite this claim, the trial court, on
proper request, has power to reread any portion of the charge already
Civen, or may go further and give additional instructions to clarify
111 Id. at 283, 270 P.2d at 119.
112 Id. at 285, 270 P.2d at 120.
113 Halada v. Venice Lake Park, Inc., 132 Cal. App. 2d 788, 283 P.2d 42 (1955).
114 Id. at 790, 283 P.2d at 43.
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those previously read."" The court's failure to answer a juror's ques-
tion on a matter that had not been covered by an instruction is preju-
dicial error.116
What must always be guarded against is the misdirecting of the
jury during the reinstruction period. So, for example, the court com-
mits prejudicial error when it is requested to reread all the instructions
on negligence and assumption of risk and, after inadvertently omitting
three instructions, tells the jury that all the instructions have been re-
read;117 and is also at fault when it goes beyond the specific question
asked by the jury and gives an erroneous instruction.",, But no such
prejudice occurs if the jury return for more instructions on damages
(after being told to consider legal responsibility first and then, if plain-
tiff was entitled to a verdict, to consider damages), and in so instruct-
ing them the court uses the words "if any" to qualify phrases like "the
injuries proved to have been sustained," "anxiety and suffering," "ex-
penses incurred," "time lost," and "amount of such damages." Criti-
cism of the phrase "if any" is "hypertechnical."1 9
When charges of judicial coercion are raised to explain why a jury
reached the "wrong" verdict after an initial deadlock, the trial judge's
- 5 See Muskin v. Gerun, 46 Cal. App. 2d 404, 116 P.2d 105 (1941). The lower
court's judgment, however, was reversed for defects in the general charge. Accord, Lin-
coln v. Williams, 119 Cal. App. 498, 6 P.2d 563 (1932). See also Olson v. Standard
Marine Ins. Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 130, 240 P.2d 379 (1952), holding that a party is not
entitled as a matter of right to have instructions read which the jury have not called for,
nor have instructions on a particular subject read when the jury are satisfied with those
that were already presented.
110 Brooks v. City of Monterey, 106 Cal. App. 649, 290 Pac. 540 (1930). See also
Bryant v. Market St. Ry., 71 Cal. App. 2d 508, 163 P.2d 33 (1945), holding that it was
proper for the court to reread a particular instruction and suggesting it might have been
error for the court to refuse. A dissent in Bryant argued that, considering the state of
the evidence, it was prejudicial error to give the disputed instruction in an unqualified
form, especially when the jury had "run away" with the case. For the difficulty in prov-
ing that the court had refused to reinstruct the jury, see McAvoy v. Helms Bakeries, 43
Cal. App. 2d 587, 111 P.2d 431 (1941).
117 Davis v. Erickson, 53 Cal. 2d 860, 3 Cal. Rptr. 567, 350 P.2d 535 (1960). The
judge here failed to reread the only instruction on the legal effect of an intervening cause.
An argument that no prejudice resulted because this instruction was originally given
"overlooks the realities of the case." But cf. Cohan v. Brodie, 57 Cal. App. 2d 307, 134
P.2d 498 (1943).
11s See Scott v. Benz, 67 Cal. App. 2d 428, 154 P.2d 738 (1945). The trial court
here had granted a new trial because he realized his error. On appeal his use of discre-
tionary power was affirmed.
110 Gray v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 143 Cal. App. 2d 537, 299 P.2d 900 (1956). Some con-
fusion resulted because the foreman originally stated that the jury had agreed on liability,
but later amended this statement to say that no formal agreement had been reached. For
other cases in which the court's response to the jury's inquiry was held proper, see Graham
v. Griffin, 66 Cal. App. 2d 116, 151 P.2d 879 (1944); Ridge v. Boulder Creek Union J.-S.
High School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 2d,453, 140 P.2d 990 (1943); Long v. Chronicle Pub.
Co., 68 Cal. App. 171, 228 Pac. 873 (1924).
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authority must be examined. Among his powers, he has wide discre-
tion in determining the length of time a jury can deliberate before he
must discharge them; 20 and can have the jury returned to court to ask
them about the probability of an agreement and about the way they
stand numerically (without revealing for whom they stand) .121 He
has the right to advise them about the importance of reaching a verdict
and about each juror's duty to hear and consider the others' arguments
with open minds, rather than obstinate adherence to first impressions.
Yet "the judge may not tell them that they must agree nor may he harry
their deliberations by coercive threats or disparaging remarks."'
22
In a criminal case, he must not make comments to the jurors which
might reasonably be interpreted as indicating his belief in the guilt of
the accused. This prohibition extends to insistence on agreement
when the court knows that the jurors favoring acquittal constitute a
small minority, and to the giving of an impression that there is no basis
in the evidence for a reasonable difference of opinion about the de-
fendant's guilt: 123
120 Hughes v. Schwartz, 51 Cal. App. 2d 362, 124 P.2d 886 (1942). Although the
court, counsel, and the jurors "engaged in some jocularity which appellant now seeks to
distort into impatience, importunity and coercion on the part of the court" no abuse of
discretion was shown. See also Bertolozzi v. Progressive Concrete Co., 95 Cal. App. 2d
332, 212 P.2d 910 (1949), holding that a party waives its right to complain if it gambles
on a verdict in its favor by remaining quiet when the jury, after an early deadlock, is
required to continue their deliberations.
121 Pandolfo v. Jackson, 12 Cal. App. 2d 232, 55 P.2d 550 (1936).
122 Coo v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., 13 Cal. 2d 591, 594, 91 P.2d 118, 120 (1939).
In reversing the judgment, the appellate court noted that the trial judge's colloquy with
the jury foreman carried the plain implication that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover
and that the jury should take ten minutes to bring in the appropriate verdict. Also con-
sidered as bearing on the judge's strong personal opinion about the case is the statement
he made following the verdict: "Thank you, ladies and gentlemen of the jury. I do not
see how you could have arrived at any other verdict. Had you given any other verdict,
it would have been set aside." 13 Cal. 2d at 595, 91 P.2d at 120. For a case annulling
an order of contempt against a defendant's attorney for protesting a trial judge's "well
nigh unheard of" conduct in recalling the jury after three weeks of deliberation to state
his opinion that the defendants testified falsely and the prosecution witnesses told the
truth, see Cooper v. Superior Court, 55 Cal. 2d 291, 10 Cal. Rptr. 824, 359 P.2d 274
(1961). See also Shippy v. Peninsula Rapid Transit Co., 197 Cal. 290, 240 Pac. 785
(1925), holding that a trial judge commits prejudicial error by asking a jury if they are
prepared to pass on the issues without final arguments or instructions; and Mahoney v.
San Francisco & S.M. Ry., 110 Cal. 471, 42 Pac. 968, 43 Pac. 518 (1895), holding that
prejudicial error arises when the trial judge states that the trial was an expensive one, that
the plaintiff was not well off, and that he (the judge) would help those jurors "who can-
not agree."
123 People v. Crowley, 101 Cal. App. 2d 71, 76, 224 P.2d 748, 751 (1950). This
case is an important precedent to be used in supporting claims that a trial judge com-
mitted prejudicial misconduct. But see Alvarez v. Los Angeles County, 132 Cal. App. 2d
525, 282 P.2d 531 (1955), a civil case distinguishing Crowley because the judge in
Crowley indicated his belief in the defendant's guilt and gave the jury half an hour to
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Reasonably intelligent jurors would know that the court would not
permit a defendant to be convicted upon legally insufficient evidence
and would have understood that the court in the present case was not
impressed by the weakness of the evidence of the People. Since they
were not advised to acquit the defendant they could reasonably
have inferred that the court expected them to convict him. Any ques-
tion as to the interpretation that was placed upon the court's remarks
finds an answer in the verdict of guilty which was rendered some 30
minutes later.
These limitations on the trial judge's powers have the disadvantage
of preventing the one knowledgeable neutral in the case from insisting
(apart from his instructions) that the controversy be decided on what
his experience tells him are valid grounds. But, more importantly, the
limitations help in leaving justice to the "amateurs," the ordinary citi-
zens on whose ultimate wisdom all legality must rely.
Chance Verdicts
Chance verdicts are condemned as an abdication of the jury's func-
tion to hear and determine a case on its merits.12 4 So objectionable is
the resort to chance that Code of Civil Procedure section 657(2) pro-
vides the only statutory exception to the rule against jurors' affidavits
impeaching their own verdict, and permits "the affidavit of any one of
the jurors" to prove this misconduct.
What, then, constitutes a chance verdict? Examples of "pure
chance (such as basing a verdict on the next out-of-state license plate
to be seen in the street) have not been encountered, nor in all prob-
ability would such rampant mischief ever occur. The ordinary situa-
tion involves an agreement by each of the jurors to secretly write down
the sum he would like to award. These amounts are then added to-
gether and the result divided by twelve to produce a quotient that
represents the "average" or "anithmetic mean." At least one early
case 2 5 approvingly held that where the jurors had bound themselves
to accept this quotient without further consultation or discussion,
neither the individual sums nor the arithmetical computations were
the result of chance "but, on the contrary, the result of the most accu-
bring in a verdict, while the judge in the present case neither coerced the jury nor urged
them to reach a particular verdict. And see People v. Dolan, 38 Cal. App. 2d 96, 100
P.2d 791 (1940), holding that the judge's statement, "there should be no difficulty in ar-
riving at a verdict in this case" gives no indication of the verdict which the judge believed
was proper, and does not constitute coercion.
124 See, e.g., Balkwill v. City of Stockton, 50 Cal. App. 2d 661, 123 P.2d 596 (1942),
discussing the purpose behindCAL. CODE Civ. Pnoc. § 657(2). Cf. CAL. PEN. CODE
§ 1181(4).
125 Turner v. Tuolumne Water Co., 25 Cal. 397, 402 (1864), disapproved in Dixon
v. Pluns, 98 Cal. 384, 33 Pac. 268 (1893).
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rate of the sciences." This "scientific" process was soon rejected be-
cause the character of the verdict is "entirely unknown to the jurors as
though the whole matter were decided by the casting of a die, or the
tossing of a coin." 126 Under a system of this nature, "one unscrupulous
and cunning juror always has the power to defeat justice by increasing
or decreasing the amount of the verdict in proportion as he places his
estimate at an unconscionably high or low figure."1
27
The present concept of a chance verdict largely depends on the
point of time in which the jurors agree to be bound by a quotient ver-
dict. If the agreement to accept an "average" total is made before the
result is known, the verdict is improperly based on chance. If, how-
ever, the jurors simply average the sums each has in mind, learn the
resulting amount, and then individually decide to adopt this amount
as the verdict, the procedure 'is acceptable. "Thus, if a jury adopts a
quotient verdict by independent action after the amount is made know
to them, such approval subsequent to averaging the sums constitutes
a valid verdict."128
Proof of this decisive chronology is usually based on statements
made in jurors' affidavits and counter-affidavits, procured by the par-
ties to justify their respective demands at the hearing on a motion for
new trial. An affidavit by a party is properly disregarded because it
could not be assumed, in the absence of proof, that he was present in
the jury room or had any personal knowledge of what took place there
while the jurymen were considering their verdict.129 Similarly, a trial
judge is justified in accepting the sworn statements of identified jury-
men against the affidavit of an attorney, on information and belief, that
the verdict was based on chance, when the sources of the attorney's
information "were unwilling to either state the facts under oath or to
allow their identity to be disclosed." 130 If the affidavits are conflicting,
126 Dixon v. Pluns, 98 Cal. 384, 387, 33 Pac. 268, 269 (1893).
127 Ibid.
128 Monroe v. Lashus, 170 Cal. App. 2d 1, 5, 338 P.2d 13, 15 (1959). Interestingly
enough, the same ideas prevailed at common law before the passage of CAL. CODE CIV.
PRoc. § 657(2). See Wilson v. Berryman, 5 Cal. 44 (1855). This conclusion has also
been reached in Will v. Southern Pac., 18 Cal. 2d 468, 116 P.2d 44 (1941); Griffith v.
Oak Ridge Oil Co., 190 Cal. 389, 212 Pac. 913 (1923); McDonnell v. Pescadero & San
Mateo Stage Co., 120 Cal. 476, 52 Pac. 725 (1898); Hunt v. Elliott, 77 Cal. 588, 20 Pac.
132 (1888); Buhl v. Wood Trucking Lines, 62 Cal. App. 2d 542, 144 P.2d 847 (1944);
Balkwill v. City of Stockton, 50 Cal. App. 2d 661, 123 P.2d 596 (1942).
129 Hoare v. Hindley, 49 Cal. 274 (1874).
132 McDonnell v. Pescadero & San Mateo Stage Co., 120 Cal. 476, 478, 52 Pac. 725,
726 (1898). Prompted by the discovery of slips of paper in the jury room, with tables
of figures apparently bearing out the claim of a chance verdict, the court said: "If we
were at liberty to accept the affidavit of defendants' counsel and reject the affidavits of
the two jurymen in support of the verdict, we would unhesitatingly decide that the ver-
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the trial judge has discretion to weigh this evidence and his findings
are ordinarily not disturbed on appeal. 131 The discretionary scope in-
cludes a finding, unless erroneous as a matter of law, on whether any
real conflict exists between the supposedly-contradictory affidavits.
13 2
Lest we be too pleased with the court's condemnation of chance
verdicts, we might ask why a jury forbidden from committing itself to
an "average" verdict is allowed to make such more illusive calculations
as the amount of future damages for loss of business profits when the
means of fixing these damages are uncertain;' 33 the reduced earning
power of a minor who had not earned anything before or after the ac-
cident; 84 and the proper money award that will compensate for pain
and suffering.135 In cases of this kind, the most "scientific" measure-
ments will undoubtedly be as wide of (or as near) the mark as any
good-faith average.
Compromise Verdicts
Through a wise, simple, and apparently effective technique, courts
can remedy one type of impropriety in the deliberation room while
still protecting the secrecy of the jury's deliberations. The mischief in
question is a compromise verdict, usually the result of a vigorously
fought trial which leads some jurors to surrender their views on the
defendant's non-liability in exchange for other jurors agreeing to a
trifling amount of damages. 136 What makes the verdict objectionable
is the "inevitable" conclusion that nine jurors could not agree on the
question of defendant's negligence or of its having proximately caused
plaintiff's injuries. 137
The issue, in most cases, is initially created when a disappointed
winning party moves for a new trial on the ground that the inadequate
damages reflect an insufficiency of the evidence to justify the ver-
dict was reached by such a 'resort to the determination of chance' as would be good
ground for a new trial." 120 Cal. at 478, 52 Pac. at 126.
13, Monroe v. Lashus, 170 Cal. App. 2d 1, 338 P.2d 13 (1959).
1S2 Buhl v. Wood Trucking Lines, 62 Cal. App. 2d 542, 144 P.2d 847 (1944). Here,
the lower court had granted a new trial on defendant's motion. In affirming this result,
the appellate court noted that, on the same facts, it would have also affirmed an order
denying a new trial.
133 Southern Cal. Disinfecting Co. v. Lomkin, 183 Cal. App. 2d 431, 7 Cal. Rptr.
43 (1960).
'34 Girard v. Irvine, 97 Cal. App. 377, 275 Pac. 840 (1929).
135 Souza v. Richardson, 177 Cal. App. 2d 93, 1 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1960).
136See Wallace v. Miller, 26 Cal. App. 2d 55, 78 P.2d 745 (1938); Bencich v.
Market St. Ry., 20 Cal. App. 2d 518, 67 P.2d 398 (1937); Donnatin v. Union Hardware
& Metal Co., 38 Cal. App. 8, 175 Pac. 26 (1918).
137 See Wallace v. Miller, supra note 136.
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dict. 138 If this were the sole dispute, the controversy could be routinely
handled just like any other motion for new trial. At this point, how-
ever, the parties usually begin to squabble about whether the verdict
was the result of an improper compromise. Having had the question
of liability decided in his favor, the plaintiff is likely to assert that no
such compromise was made and that the new trial should be granted
on the issue of damages alone. The defendant ordinarily replies that
the motion should be denied because the evidence justifies the verdict
or, failing in this contention, that a new trial should be granted on all
the issues, liability as well as damages, because the jury had improperly
resolved the question of liability against him. In ruling on the motion,
the trial court has discretion to determine whether or not the verdict
stemmed from the allegedly improper compromise. If he finds that it
did, any new trial that he grants should be granted on all the issues.
139
To evaluate the verdict, neither the trial court nor the appellate
court seeks to discover the actual transactions that were conducted in
the jury room. Logic, rather than a descriptive narrative of events,
supports the eventual conclusion. If, for example, the award is "so
grossly absurd" that it furnishes convincing proof the verdict resulted
from unwarranted concessions made by each of two opposing factions,
one conscientiously believing defendant should prevail and the other
equally conscientious in believing plaintiff should recover full dam-
ages, 140 or if the award "barely, if at all" repays plaintiff's special dam-
ages, 141 these facts are sufficient to establish that the verdict was based
on an improper compromise. But even where the evidence amply sup-
ports a conclusion that the damages were too low, an inference that
the jurors must have stultified themselves by bargaining inadequate
damages for unjustified liability is a non sequitur. Such a conclusion,
especially where the trial court reached a contrary result, would be
more speculative than inferential.14
2
138 See CAL. CODE Cr. Pnoc. § 657(6). The moving party, of course, really means
that the damages are insufficient in light of the "over-sufficiency" of the evidence. But,
conforming to statutory language, he claims the evidence is insufficient. By contrast, if
a losing party wishes to complain of excessive damages, CAL. CODE CIV. Paoc. § 657(5)
permits him to do so without these linguistic gymnastics.
139 For a new trial granted on the sole issue of damages, see Tornell v. Munson, 80
Cal. App. 2d 123, 181 P.2d 112 (1947); Hughes v. Schwartz, 51 Cal. App. 2d 362, 124
P.2d 886 (1942); Cox v. Tyrone Power, Inc., 49 Cal. App. 2d 383, 121 P.2d 829 (1942).
For a new trial granted on all the issues, see Wallace v. Miller, 26 Cal. App. 2d 55, 78
P.2d 745 (1938); Bencich v. Market St. Ry., 20 Cal. App. 2d 518, 67 P.2d 398 (1937).
For the denial of a new trial, see Sassano v. Roullard, 27 Cal. App. 2d 372, 81 P.2d 213
(1938); Donnatin v. Union Hardware & Metal Co., 38 Cal. App. 8, 175 Pac. 26 (1918).
140 Donnatin v. Union Hardware & Metal Co., supra note 139.
141 Bencich v. Market St. Ry., 20 Cal. App. 2d 518, 67 P.2d 398 (1937).
142 Cox v. Tyrone Power, Inc., 49 Cal. App. 2d 383, 121 P.2d 829 (1942).
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By employing this clearly limited technique, the courts have armed
themselves with a useful small-caliber weapon to combat otherwise
unassailable jury verdicts. Until Code of Civil Procedure section 657
is amended to permit "inadequate damages" as a ground for new trial,
this method of subduing a faulty verdict without intruding on jury
solitude is commendable.
Use of Juror's Affidavits
Beginning with the first volume of its supreme court reports,
143
California courts have adopted the generally unshaken position that
statements of a juror cannot be admitted to impeach a verdict in which
he took part. "Generally unshaken," an admittedly vague term, in-
cludes one statutory exception, one case law exception, and at least
one decision (subsequently disapproved) that suggested other possible
exceptions.
The statutory exception is California Code of Civil Procedure sec-
tion 657(2), which permits jurors' affidavits to be used in showing
that a verdict was the result of chance determination.'4 The case law
exception applies in situations where proceedings in the deliberation
room reveal that one or more jurors gave false answers on voir dire
to conceal their bias.1' 5 The tentatively advanced and soon rejected
third category of exceptions was predicated on the theory that, under
California Code of Civil Procedure section 657(1), jurors' affidavits
might be available to show an irregularity in jury proceedings by
which a party was prevented from having a fair trial.146
At a time when the only exception to the general rule was that
dealing with chance verdicts, one court frowned:
47
Why the legislature should sanction different modes of proving dif-
ferent kinds of misconduct is not readily perceived. If the affidavits
of jurors are to be received for the purpose of establishing certain
kinds of misconduct, there seems to be no good reason why they
should not be received as to all kinds without distinction.
'4 See People v. Baker, 1 Cal. 403 (1851).
144 See text at notes 124-35.
1 Williams v. Bridges, 140 Cal. App. 537, 35 P.2d 407 (1934), apparently the first
California case in which this exception is expressly treated, though it cites Clark v. United
States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933) and People v. Galloway, 202 Cal. 81, 259 Pac. 332 (1927) in
support of the same proposition. Galloway was based on CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1179-82,
which are narrower in scope than CAL. CODE Civ. Paoc. § 657.
146 Articulated in Shipley v. Permanente Hospital, 127 Cal. App. 2d 417, 274 P.2d
53 (1954); disapproved in Kollert v. Cundiff, 50 Cal. 2d 768, 329 P.2d 897 (1958). See
Note, 10 HAsniNcs L.J. 319 (1959).
47 S. S. Turner v. Tuolumne County Water Co., 25 Cal. 397, 400 (1864). The
statute in question was the old PnAc-vcE AcT § 193.
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Yet except for a reference to legislative authority as constituting
"public policy," courts have not explained the rationale behind this
bifurcated attitude. In justifying the exclusionary rule as applied to
other misconduct, however, courts have made their doctrine clear:
148
There are many reasons to support the rule that an affidavit of a juror
is incompetent to impeach the verdict. The reason most frequently
given for the rule is that the verdict having been reached by the
solemn deliberations of the jury, after hearing the evidence and in-
structions, should not be lightly set aside because of the subsequent
doubts or change of attitude by one of the jurors. Such rule would
permit a juror to stultify his own solemn pronouncement and deci-
sion. Another reason is that jurors should be protected in the exercise
of their function and their duties, and should not thereafter be sub-
ject to examination or pressure by litigants.
Consistent with this view, courts have refused to consider jurors'
affidavits which stated that some members of the jury had visited the
scene of an accident and reported on their personal observations;1 49
that the foreman "manipulated the (affiant's) ignorance and confu-
sion";150 that the jurors misunderstood the effect of defendant's coun-
terclaim on the amount admittedly due to plaintiff;' 5 ' that a juror said
as far as she was concerned the type of accident in question happened
every day and any one of the jurors might have done the same thing;
152
148 Davenport v. Waite, 175 Cal. App. 2d 623, 627, 346 P.2d 501, 503 (1959). See
also Saltzman v. Sunset Tel. & Tel. Co., 125 Cal. 501, 504-05, 58 Pac. 169, 170 (1899):
"The independence of the jury and the value of their discussions would be lessened if
the reasons given by any juror for his opinions or for his verdict could be reported to the
court and criticized, and his motives impugned for remarks made in the jury-room. And
such reports would be more likely to be made by dissenting jurors who had been heated
by earnest debate and defeated by the final vote. But the independence of the jury would
be gone if a perfectly correct report could be made and the verdict attacked by showing
that some jurors mistook the evidence or the law, or were actuated by other considera-
tions. There would be no freedom of discussion in the jury-room if they were subject to
a possible censorship of this character. And the stability of judicial determinations would
be as much imperiled by liability to attack by dissenting jurors as by the others." But cf.
Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933), affirming a juror's conviction for contempt of
court, in which Cardozo, J. wrote: "Freedom of debate might be stifled and independence
of thought checked if jurors were made to feel that their arguments and ballots were to
be freely published to the world. The force of these considerations is not to be gainsaid.
But the recognition of a privilege does not mean that it is without conditions or excep-
tions. The social policy that will prevail in many situations may run foul in others of a
different social policy, competing for supremacy .... The chance that now and then
there may be found some timid soul who will take counsel of his fears and give way to
their repressive power is too remote and shadowy to shape the course of justice. It must
yield to the overmastering need, so vital in our polity, of preserving trial by jury in its
purity against the inroads of corruption." 289 U.S. at 13, 16.
149 Maffeo v. Holmes, 47 Cal. App. 2d 292, 117 P.2d 948 (1941).
150 People v. Koss, 115 Cal. 567, 47 Pac. 459 (1897).
151 Polhemus v. Heiman, 50 Cal. 438 (1875).
152 Winningar v. Bales, 194 Cal. App. 2d --- , 14 Cal. Rptr. 908 (1961).
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that the foreman told the jurors they would have to abide by the ver-
dicts he completed or they would never again be allowed to act as
jurors; 158 and that the foreman mentioned high insurance premiums
as being caused by high judgments. 54
Not only are the jurors prohibited from impeaching their verdict
(exceptions aside), but third persons are also incompetent to impeach
the verdict on the basis of hearsay evidence derived from a juror. "If
a member of the jury may not impeach the verdict by his personal
affidavit or oral testimony, certainly he may not circumvent the rule
by informing an attorney of the appellants by means of a telephone
of his alleged misconduct as a juror and thus render his statement
competent by the hearsay affidavit of some other afflant."t 5"
The rule against admissibility is relaxed when jurors attempt to
sustain their verdict, but is quickly tightened up when this attempt is
based on the subjective attitude of the majority jurors. Jurors' affida-
vits are therefore admissible to disprove or explain the alleged miscon-
duct but, once the misconduct is admitted, are ineffectual to show that
the verdict was not influenced by those events.1 56
Formidable as these rules might be, the courts have themselves
announced an exception to their own rule against using jurors' affida-
vits to impeach a verdict. Although a litigant was unsuccessful at the
turn of the century in arguing that a valid distinction exists between
a juror's misconduct before retirement and his misconduct after retire-
ment,157 chronology later became a paramount consideration. The
earlier case, in refusing to accept an affidavit which alleged that during
the trial a juror had improperly visited the scene of an accident,
pointed out that judicial decisions should not struggle to multiply ex-
ceptions to a plain and simple rule. When, however, an affidavit was
offered in another case to show that a juror had witnessed the disputed
accident, had formed an opinion about liability, and had falsely denied
'53Kollert v. Cundiff, 50 Cal. 2d 768, 329 P.2d 897 (1958).
154 Brickel v. Wittmar, 175 Cal. App. 2d 190, 345 P.2d 494 (1959).
155 Woods v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 91 Cal. App. 2d 572, 577, 205 P.2d 738, 741
(1949). Accord, Siemsen v. Oakland, S.L. & H. Elec. Ry., 134 Cal. 494, 66 Pac. 672
(1901); McWilliams v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 100 Cal. App. 2d 27, 222 P.2d 953
(1950). Cf. People v. Conkling, 111 Cal. 616, 44 Pac. 314 (1896), in which the affi-
davits of third persons, though circumstantial, were held sufficient to impeach a verdict.
156 Kimic v. San Jose-Los Gatos Ry., 156 Cal. 379, 104 Pac. 986 (1909); Saltzman
v. Sunset Tel. & Tel. Co., 125 Cal. 501, 58 Pac. 169 (1899); Kritzer v. Citron, 101 Cal.
App. 2d 33, 224 P.2d 808 (1950); Walter v. Ayvazian, 134 Cal. App. 360, 25 P.2d 526
(1933). But cf. People v. Murray, 94 Cal. 212, 29 Pac. 494 (1892), in which it was held
proper for jurors to aver that they fully denied the defendant's charges of misconduct,
that no admonition of the court had been disobeyed, and that no newspaper articles or
anything else, save the evidence and the charge, influenced them in finding their verdict.
1
5
7 Siemsen v. Oakland, S.L. & H. Elec. Ry., 134 Cal. 494, 66 Pac. 672 (1901).
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on her voir dire examination that she had any knowledge of the event,
the court held that this affidavit should have been received.'58 Why?
Because, said the court, the bar applies to words or acts that are in-
herent in the verdict and had their origin after the impanelment and
before the discharge of the jury. The bar does not apply to an affidavit
which shows a juror's positive misconduct in concealing actual bias
on the voir dire examination. Stated another way, an affidavit is ad-
missible to show that occurrences during the deliberations tend to dis-
close a bias on the part of the juror which, if known on the voir dire
examination, would have led to a challenge for cause. 159
The "chance" and "prejudice concealed on voir dire" exceptions
now mark the only situations in which jurors' affidavits are competent
to impeach a verdict, although "whether or not additional exceptions
may be justified under some circumstances" is theoretically still an
open question.160
Before suggesting the proper guide for California courts to adopt
in this area, we should examine a fact that has apparently been over-
looked in the arguments for a limited (i.e., virtually nonexistent) use
of these affidavits. As previously indicated, one reason to prohibit
jurors from impeaching their own verdict is that this practice could
expose their opponents in the deliberation room to public criticism.
The possible harm is real, but the alleged cure is so inadequate that
it should not be used to sustain a verdict based on jury misconduct. As
long as a juror can "expose" his former colleagues outside of court and
suffer no penalty, the permanent secrecy of jury deliberations depends
only on the degree of public interest in the trial. When the case is
notorious, both the press and the television media are likely to pressure
the jurors for information that can become headlines like: HISS
JURORS TELL OF LONG HOURS OF WRANGLING;' 16 or televi-
158 Williams v. Bridges, 140 Cal. App. 537, 35 P.2d 407 (1934).
1 9 Shipley v. Permanente Hospital, 127 Cal. App. 2d 417, 274 P.2d 53 (1954). See
also Kollert v. Cundiff, 50 Cal. 2d 768, 329 P.2d 897 (1958), disapproving other state-
ments in Shipley.
160 See Kollert v. Cundiff, 50 Cal. 2d 768, 329 P.2d 897 (1958). See also United
States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361, 364 (1851), in which Chief Justice Taney said:
"It would perhaps hardly be safe to lay down any general rule upon this subject. Un-
questionably such evidence ought always to be received with great caution. But cases
might arise in which it would be impossible to refuse them without violating the plainest
principles of justice."
161 See Spotlight on the Jury, in LIELING, THE PRESS 144-62 (1961). From a news-
paper article, the author (at 147) quotes a pro-conviction juror stating that the four
pro-acquittal jurors in the first Alger Hiss case were "so stubborn you could have knocked
their heads against the wall and it would have made no difference. The foreman was
emotional, two were blockheads, and one was a dope. Eight of us pounded the hell out
of the four since Thursday night, but we couldn't get anywhere." The same newspaper,
The New York Journal-American, later reported that: "All jurors in the trial reported
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sion announcements like:'
62
You will sit with the men of a federal jury as they deliberate the fate
of a defendant accused of kidnapping and murder. You will see and
hear what actually goes on behind the guarded doors of the jury
room as these men turn over in their minds each bit of evidence to
determine whether another human being shall be set free or spend
the rest of his life in a federal penitentiary, whether another human
being shall live or die.
Unless the jurors can be restrained from discussing these matters
outside the deliberation room (a possibility which should be rejected
on first amendment grounds), no valid reason exists to protect jury
privacy from legitimate complaints before a court which has power to
remedy the misconduct. Accepting this fact (as the author does), we
are left with only one major consideration against making jurors' affi-
davits competent to impeach a verdict: the fear that a juror might
have subsequent doubts about his vote and seek to upset the verdict
by his present statements. To prevent that possibility while permitting
a verdict developed through misconduct to be attacked, our courts
should adopt a principle enunciated by the Kansas Supreme Court and
approved by the United States Supreme Court,1 8 though apparently
rejected by the California Supreme Court.16 4 The principle states:1
65
Public policy forbids that a matter resting in the personal conscious-
ness of one juror should be received to overthrow the verdict, because
being personal it is not accessible to other testimony; it gives to the
secret thought of one the power to disturb the expressed conclusions
of twelve; its tendency is to produce bad faith on the part of a minor-
ity, to induce an apparent acquiscence with the purpose of subse-
quent dissent; to induce tampering with individual jurors subsequent
to the verdict. But as to overt acts, they are accessible to the knowl-
edge of all the jurors; if one affirms misconduct, the remaining eleven
receiving telephone calls and mail commenting on their stand. Those who voted for con-
viction received expressions of approval while those who stood for acquittal reported
'threats."' Perhaps as a public service, the Journal-American then printed the names and
addresses of two pro-acquittal jurors.
162See United States v. Rees, 193 F. Supp. 849, 861, 864, 866 (D.C. Md. 1961).
The three Rees opinions include first (at 849) the main case of kidnapping and murder;
second (at 861), the disposition of defendant's motion for new trial or mistrial because
of a television program, featuring nine jury members, that was presented the evening
before the judge was to have sentenced the defendant; third (at 864), the court's accept-
ance of the fact that it has no power to punish for contempt the persons who were respon-
sible for the television program or appeared on the show.
103 Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892), quoting an earlier case written by
Mr. Justice Brewer when he was speaking for the Kansas Supreme Court.
164 See Kollert v. Cundiff, 50 Cal. 2d 768, 329 P.2d 897 (1958), which says that a
few jurisdictions permit a wider use of jurors' affidavits than does California, and cites
Mattox as one example.
165 Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 148 (1892).
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can deny; one cannot disturb the action of the twelve; it is useless to
tamper with one, for the eleven may be heard.
The thought always to be borne in mind is that the jury system is
designed to benefit litigants, not jurors.
